I’m a Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Reading.
I’m a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Reading. Before coming to Reading, I finished my PhD (in philosophy) in 2014 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Before that, I took a BA in Mathematics and Philosophy in 2005 at Exeter College, Oxford.
I have three main research projects:
Standard models of decision-making assume total precision in our preferences and beliefs. But there is a lot of debate about whether we can or should be so precise. I am interested in the connections between phenomena including imprecise preferences, vague projects, unsharp credences, and the Incommensurability of Value.
I am particularly interested in the implications of these for climate change: how can it be rational to forego a flight now, to mitigate climate change in fifty years, even as we admit that each flight has negligible climate effect? And can this question be answered publicly?
I’m interested in Humean or internalist accounts of reasons, especially in what these ‘austere’ theories say about our place in the world, and how much they deserve to be called nihilist. How much support does modern science provide to a nihilist view of the world?
Satisficing consequentialism is a natural response to ‘demandingness’ worries that beset its maximising cousins, but it has proved rather unpopular. Most defences of satisficing have adopted ‘agent-relative’ versions of the view, but I consider a full-blown agent-neutral satisficing normative theory.
I am on research leave for the Autumn and Spring terms 2016-17, but in Summer I will teach PP1EL: Elementary Logic.